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1 Introduction
A small open economy peopled by infinite-lived maximizing consumers with a
constant rate of time discount, operating in a world of perfect financial capital
mobility, in which capital formation is absent or, if endogenous, does not in-
volve adjustment costs, exhibits degenerate dynamics. Degenerate dynamics
means that the economy is always in the steady state and jumps instanta-
neously from one equilibrium to another, with no transitional dynamics if an
exogenous shock occurs; see Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1984), Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), and Turnovsky (1997).
The degeneracy of the dynamics derives from the pathological structure
taken by the Euler equation, which, by ensuring the intertemporal arbitrage
condition between consumption and wealth returns, governs the growth in the
marginal utility of wealth. In the context just described, such Euler equation
implies a constant marginal utility of wealth, as the given world interest rate
must be set arbitrarily equal to the fixed rate of subjective time discount, in
order to have an interior finite steady state. This strong implication renders
the state matrix of the dynamic system singular as the eigenvalue associated
with the predetermined variable, i.e. net foreign assets, is zero. This problem
is known in the literature as the ”zero root problem”; see, for a methological
discussion, Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985) and Buiter (1986).
There are several operative ways to introduce some sluggishness into this
small open economy with the scope of making the eigenvalue associated with
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the predetermined variable nonzero and thereby obtaining nondegenerate dy-
namics. Specifically, transitional dynamics can be obtained by considering
in turn:1 i) an endogenous subjective rate of time preference (see Obstfeld,
1981 and 1982a); ii) imperfect asset substitutability and/or capital mobility
(see Obstfeld 1982b, Turnovsky, 1987, and Bhandari, Haque and Turnovsky,
1990);2 iii) overlapping-generations demographics (see Blanchard, 1984 and
1985, and Obstfeld, 1989); iv) convex adjustment costs for capital accumu-
lation (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, and Sen and Turnovsky, 1989a and
1989b); and v) habit-forming preferences (see Obstfeld, 1992, and Mansoo-
rian, 1993).
Procedures i), ii) and iii) introduce some inertia into the economy by
aﬀecting the Euler equation directly,3 while procedures iv) and v) generate
saddle-point dynamics by leaving the ”Keynes-Ramsey rule” unaﬀected and
considering de facto additional dynamic variables, like the Tobin q or the
habitual standard of living, respectively.4
The objective of this paper is to show that the assumption of elastic fer-
tility choices, which renders population growth endogenous, represents an
1A comprehensive survey of the diﬀerent procedures that make it possible to overcome
the ”zero root problem” is provided by Turnovsky (1997, chapters 1 and 2).
2This hypothesis can be implemented by considering either brokerage costs for holding
foreign assets or an upward-sloping supply curve of debt.
3In particular, procedure i) makes the rate of time preference a function of the utility
level à la Uzawa, procedure ii) instead, renders the domestic interest rate endogenous,
while procedure iii) introduces a wedge between the world interest rate and the rate of
time preference that depends on the consumption-wealth ratio.
4Note that the sources of sluggishness considered by procedures iv) and v) imply that
the steady state model depends on the initial conditions.
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additional mode (unconsidered before) of introducing nondegenerate dynam-
ics within an infinite-horizon small open economy, facing a perfect world
financial market and having a fixed discount rate. The crucial element that
invalidates the degeneracy of the dynamics in this economy is a demand for
fertility that depends on financial wealth in the short-run; the introduction
of endogenous population growth in the Euler-Keynes-Ramsey condition, by
making the marginal utility of wealth variable in the short-run, avoids the ar-
bitrary equalization of the rate of time preference to the given world interest
rate.
The dynamic behavior of this economy is studied for two exogenous
shocks: i) an increase in thrift; and ii) an increase in government spending.
Although these two disturbances exert diﬀerentiated long-run consequences
on the economy, they have common features regarding the short-run behav-
ior. An increase in thrift, i.e. a decline in the rate of time discount, alters
consumption, fertility and capital stock permanently, while an increase in
government spending aﬀects consumption permanently, while aﬀecting fer-
tility and capital stock only temporarily. In both cases, we observe saddle-
point dynamics, characterized by perverse-shooting of the jumping variables
on impact, i.e. high impact volatility of the system after an unexepected
disturbance takes place, followed by monotonic convergence (in the opposite
direction) towards the long-run equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup. Section
3 analyzes the property of stability, while Section 4 examines the steady
state and dynamic eﬀects of exogenous disturbances. Section 5 makes some
concluding remarks.
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2 The model
Consider a real small open economy populated by competitive firms and
infinite-lived consumers that accumulate wealth in the form of physical cap-
ital and net foreign assets. This economy produces a single tradable good,
perfectly substitutable with the foreign produced good, and operates in a
perfectly integrated world capital market.
Population expands endogenously. This is obtained by allowing the fertil-
ity rate, inserted into the utility function of consumers, to be endogenously
chosen, as in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Barro and Becker (1989), and
Palivos (1995).
The representative consumer’s objective is to maximize the functional
] ∞
0
[U(c) + V (n)]e−δtdt (1)
subject to the time allocation constraint
l + T (n) = 1, (2)
the flow budget constraint
c+
.
a= (r∗ − n)a+ wl − q, (3)
and the condition a(0) = a0 > 0. The notation employed in the problem
(1)-(3) has the following interpretation: c is per capita consumption, n the
fertility rate, δ the rate of time preference (constant), l labor hours per capita,
T ( ) time spent for child-rearing, a per capita wealth, r∗ the world interest
rate (exogenous), w real wage, and q per capita lump-sum taxes.
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The instantaneous utility function, assumed to be additively separable
in consumption and fertility, is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing
and strictly concave in its arguments.5 The fertility rate corresponds to
population growth because the mortality rate is assumed to be zero and no
immigration from the rest of the world is considered.
According to the time allocation constraint (2), the fixed time endowment
(normalized to one) can be divided between labor and child-rearing.6 The
function T (n) represents the time cost of child-rearing, with T (0)=0 and, for
n>0, T>0 , T >0, and T  ? 0.
Optimality requires
U (c) = λ (4a)
V (n) = λ[wT (n) + a] (4b)
.
λ −λδ = −λ(r∗ − n), (4c)
where λ is the shadow value of wealth. The time allocation constraint (2),
the flow budget constraint (3) and the transversality condition lim
t→∞
ae−δt = 0
must also be satisfied at the optimum.
5If preferences were not separable in consumption and fertility, no changes in our results
would be obtained provided that consumption and fertility are normal goods.
6See Wang, Yip and Scotese (1994), and Palivos (1995). Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2003), instead, consider a child-rearing cost function (which depends directly on n and
k) in the budget constraint of the representative consumer. Our results would remain
unaltered under the Barro and Sala-i-Martin approach.
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The first two equations (4a)-(4b) are the static eﬃciency conditions.
Equation (4b) asserts that the marginal rate of substitution of consump-
tion for fertility must equal the opportunity cost of one unit of fertility, given
by the wage rate times the marginal time-cost of child-rearing plus per capita
wealth. Equation (4c), deriving from the intertemporal arbitrage relation-
ship, is the Keynes-Ramsey rule.7
Per capita nonhuman wealth consists of per capita capital stock k and
per capita net foreign assets b, i.e. a = k + b. b may be either positive or
negative, while a is considered to be strictly positive.
Firms operate in competitive factor and output markets; they produce
domestic output y (expressed in per capita terms) by using capital and labor
as inputs through the production function y = F (k, l), which satisfies the
usual properties of regularity and exhibits constant returns to scale.
Maximum profit requires:
Fk(k, l) = r
∗ (5a)
Fl(k, l) = w. (5b)
Since F ( ) is linearly homogeneous, we can write F (k, l) = lf(
k
l
), with
f  > 0 and f  < 0. The world interest rate ties down capital intensity and
hence the wage rate; therefore, we have
k = κ∗l (5a’)
7As has been emphasized in the Introduction, the presence of the endogenous fertility
rate in (4c) avoids the short circuit of the dynamics in the economy.
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w = ω∗, (5b’)
where κ∗ = f −1(r∗) and ω∗ = f(κ∗)− κ∗f (κ∗).
The government plays a very small role in this economy, since it main-
tains a balanced budget by using lump-sum taxes to finance an exogenously
determined government spending g; therefore, we have q = g.
The excess of national income over aggregate demand gives the accumu-
lation rate of net foreign assets; in per capita terms, we have
.
b= y + (r
∗ − n)b− c−
.
k −nk − g. (6)
3 Dynamic properties of the model
In order to investigate the properties of stability of our economy, we may
solve (4a), (4b) and (5a’) -once (2) is used to eliminate l- for c, n and k in
terms of λ and a:
c = c(λ), c =
1
U 
< 0; (7a)
n = n(λ, a), nλ =
V 
λ Ξ
< 0; na =
λ
Ξ < 0; (7b)
k = k(λ, a), kλ =
κ∗V T 
λ Ξ
> 0, ka =
κ∗ λ
Ξ > 0; (7c)
where overbars denote long-run values and Ξ = V − λ ω∗T  < 0.
Substituting the above short-run solutions for c and n into (4c) and (6),
and linearizing around the long-run equilibrium, after the expression y =
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r∗k+ω∗[1−T (n)] has been used, we obtain the following system of autonomus
diﬀerential equations in λ and a


.
λ
.
a

 =

 η11 η12
η21 η22



 λ− λ
a− a

 (8)
where
η11 =λ nλ<0; η12 =λ na<0; η21 = −[(a +ω∗T )nλ + c] > 0;
η22 = [δ − (a +ω∗T )na] > 0.
Since the economy has one jump variable, λ, and one predetermined vari-
able, a,8 saddle-point stability requires that the matrix of coeﬃcients in (8)
must have a negative determinant, since it must admit one unstable and one
stable eigenvalue. Thus, for this requisite to be satisfied, it is required that
Φ = δV U + λ
2
< 0. (9)
Condition (9) is easily satisfied if U( ) is logarithmic and g+ω∗T+δω∗T  > ω∗.
If θ1 < 0 is the stable eigenvalue of the coeﬃcient matrix in (8), the
dynamic path of λ and a to the steady state is described by
a =a +(a0− a)eθ1t, (10a)
λ =λ −Γ(a− a), (10b)
where Γ = [θ1 + (a +ω
∗T )na − δ]
[(a +ω∗T )nλ + c]
> 0. Equation (10b) represents the
8Although a is predetermined, k and b are free to move discontinuously since capital is
costlessly mobile internationally. See Obstfeld (1989) for the same hypothesis.
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unique path that converges to the long-run equilibrium.
The basic features of the dynamics for λ and a can be grasped by using
the phase diagram associated with system (8), represented in Fig. 1. The
locus
.
λ= 0, which describes the combinations of λ and a at which the shadow
value of wealth (hence consumption) remains constant, is downward sloping
in the (λ, a) plane. The .a= 0 locus, which shows the points at which saving
vanishes, is negatively-sloped. Saddle-point stability implies that the
.
λ= 0
locus is steeper than the
.
a= 0 locus. The saddle-path SS, given by (10b), is
negatively sloped and has a slope that lies in between the slopes of the
.
λ= 0
and
.
a= 0 loci.
[Insert Fig. 1]
4 Analysis of shocks
In this section, we study the consequences of two shocks: i) a reduction in δ;
and ii) an increase in g.
In order to understand how the economy works in the long-run, we un-
derline the mechanical features of the steady state model. In the long-run,
the ”modified golden rule” (4c) determines population growth, i.e. n= r∗−δ.
Once the time allocation constraint (2) is used, the demand for capital (5a’)
establishes an inverse relationship between capital stock and fertility;9 there-
9The inverse functional relationship between fertility and capital stock represents a sort
of ”reverse Malthus eﬀect” (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003).
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fore, from (5a’), we have: k= κ∗[1 − T (r∗ − δ)]. Using these reduced-forms
for n and k, the rest of the model can be condensed as follows
c= Γ(a, r∗ − δ), Γa =
λ Ξ
V U 
> 0, Γr∗−δ = −
λ
2
V U 
> 0, (11a)
δ a +ω[1− T (r∗ − δ)] =c +g, (11b)
and λ= U (c), and b=a −κ∗[1− T (r∗ − δ)].
Equation (11a), obtained by solving for c the relation
V (r∗ − δ)
U (c)
=
ωT (r∗− δ)+ a, represents the consumption function. Consumption depends
positively on nonhuman wealth and fertility, i.e. r∗ − δ.10 Equation (11b)
states that in the steady state equilibrium the current account must be zero.
4.1 Increase in thrift
First, we analyze the steady state consequences of a decline in the rate of
time preference.11 A reduction in δ raises fertility because δ+ n is fixed
by r∗. The higher population growth rate in turn stimulates (for a given
10Notwithstanding we are considering an immortal economy, relationship (11a) is closely
resemblant to a consumption function derived from a Blanchard-Yaari ”life cycle” setup
(see Blanchard, 1985).
11The comparative statics eﬀects of a change in δ are given by:
d n
dδ
= −1 < 0; d
a
dδ
= − [λ Ξ+ V
3U 33(a +ω∗T 3)]
Φ < 0;
d c
dδ
= − [δ λ Ξ− (
a +ω∗T 3) λ
2
]
Φ < 0;
d λ
dδ
= U 33
d c
dδ
> 0;
d k
dδ
= κ∗T 3 > 0; d b
dδ
=
d a
dδ
− κ∗T 3 < 0;
where Φ < 0 has been defined in (9).
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level of a) consumption and, in order to keep the current account balanced,
wealth. Labor hours, and hence from (5a’) capital stock, are reduced because
of the higher consumption of time for child-rearing. Since the rise in n is
accompanied by a decline in capital stock, the increase in wealth is entirely
determined by a rise in net foreign assets. The marginal utility of wealth
falls.
Domestic output is reduced, while national income is pulled up as the
income earned on net foreign assets is increased. Moreover, the thriftier the
economy, the higher the steady state welfare of consumers.
Consider now the dynamic adjustment of the economy when the perma-
nent decline in δ is unexpected. As shown in Fig. 1, the new steady-state
(A1) is to the south-east of the original one (A0). The unanticipated reduc-
tion in δ shifts the saddle-path upward.12 The marginal utility of wealth
rises on impact to bring the economy onto the new saddle-path S’S’ at A01,
experiencing a perverse-shooting of its new long-run value.
The upward jump of λ causes an instantaneous drop in the fertility rate
and consumption. Capital stock jumps up in response to the fall in fertility,
having assumed that real capital is instantaneously and costlessly mobile
across borders, while net foreign assets fall abruptly so as to keep nonhuman
wealth unchanged. Labor hours and domestic output increase on impact.
Factor prices remain unchanged.
12In Fig. 1, it is assumed for simplicity that the slope of the saddle-path is unaﬀected by
the shock. The vertical translation of the saddle-path, which measures the impact eﬀect
of δ on the marginal utility of wealth, is given by:
dλ(0)
dδ
= − θ1
λ (nλδ + nac3)
< 0.
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After the system has been placed on the new stable arm, wealth begins
to accumulate, since disposable income has been brought up on impact and
consumption reduced. Consumption, fertility and net foreign assets increase
along the convergent path, recovering from the initial fall, while capital and
labor hours decline, overwhelming the first rise.
4.2 Increase in government spending
In the long-run, a rise in g, financed through higher lump-sum taxation,
leaves fertility, capital stock and gross domestic product unchanged.13 Con-
sumption, nonhuman wealth and gross national income are instead boosted.
The stock of net foreign assets is increased as well. The rise in consumption
reduces the marginal utility of wealth. Steady state welfare rises.
Turn now to the comparative dynamics. Suppose that the permanent rise
in g is unexpected. Fig. 1 can still be used to describe the dynamic eﬀect
of this experiment. The initial equilibrium is at A0 and the new one at A1.
The saddle-path shifts upward after the unexpected rise in g occurs. The
marginal utility of wealth suddenly rises.14 Consumption and fertility are
driven down abruptly, while capital stock jumps up. Since nonhuman wealth
is predetermined at its initial value, the surge of capital stock results in a net
foreign asset fall.
13The long-run multipliers of an increase in g are given by:
d n
dg
=
d k
dg
= 0;
d a
dg
=
d b
dg
=
V 3U 33
Φ > 0;
d c
dg
=
λ
2
Φ > 0;
d λ
dg
= U 33
d c
dg
< 0.
14The sudden jump in the marginal utility of wealth is:
dλ(0)
dg
=
[θ1nλ − (nλδ + nac3)]
(nλδ + nac3)[(a +ω∗T 3)nλ + c3]
> 0.
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Once the new saddle-path has been reached, the system moves monoton-
ically from A01 to A1 with an accumulation of wealth, a rise in consumption
and net foreign assets, and a reduction of the marginal utility of wealth,
fertility and capital. Fertility and capital stock return to their original levels.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed an intertemporal optimizing small open economy
model of capital accumulation with endogenous fertility, and perfect capital
mobility. We have shown that, when an endogenous population growth is in-
corporated into an infinite-lived economy with no adjustment costs associated
with capital accumulation, the dynamics are nondegenerate as endogenous
fertility choices introduce some sluggishness into the system.
The element that makes the transitional dynamics possible within such a
small open economy is a demand for fertility that in the short-run depends
on financial wealth. Since fertility enters the intertemporal Euler-Keynes-
Ramsey condition, the dynamics of the marginal utility of wealth becomes
strictly interconnected with wealth accumulation.
The dynamic behavior of the economy has been investigated for two
shocks; one that changes fertility and capital formation permanently, i.e.
a decline in the pure rate of time preference, and one that changes such
variables only temporarily, i.e. an increase in government spending. The
model exhibits saddle-point dynamics, the short-run adjustment of which is
characterized by perverse-shooting.
Three final comments are in order. First, despite the fact that a model
15
based on endogenous fertility is similar to the corresponding model with
an endogenous labor-leisure choice,15 the two models are qualitatively non-
equivalent as their short and long-run behavior diﬀers substantially. In fact,
a small open economy model with elastic labor-leisure choice and no adjust-
ment costs associated with capital accumulation exhibits degenerate dynam-
ics, contrary to the model with endogenous fertility.16
The similarity between the two models is due to the apparently identical
role of leisure and fertility. Fertility is at the same time a good as well as
indirectly an input, like leisure. Diﬀerently from leisure, however, fertility en-
ters the private budget constraint not only through the production function,
but also through the term na, and, of greater importance for our purposes
here, fertility enters the Keynes-Ramsey rule, rendering the dynamics of the
marginal utility of wealth nondegenerate.
Second, in our small open economy we have restored saddle-point dy-
namics without any dependence of the steady state model on the initial
conditions, as, instead, in Sen-Turnovsky (1989a and 1989b) and Mansoo-
rian (1993). This happens because the correction of the awkward dynamics
is performed through the equation that governs the evolution of the shadow
value of wealth.
Third, while in the short-run the evolution of the current account mirrors
that of capital formation, the two dynamics may be uncoupled along the
transition path. Moreover, as fertility specularly reflects the behavior of
capital stock, an association between fertility and net foreign assets emerges,
15This can be clearly seen if we re-write the model in terms of l by eliminating n =
T−1(1− l).
16See, for example, Turnovsky (1997, chapter 2).
16
which is very strong for the short-run.
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FIG. 1. Comparative Dynamics 
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